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Latin America after the Currency Crash in Brazil
Why the Optimists May Be Wrong
by Peter Nunnenkamp
CONTENTS
• The currency crisis in Brazil and its adverse effects on neighboring countries are widely perceived to be
short-lived phenomena. However, optimists—stressing favorable growth and investment prospects in
Latin America—tend to ignore home-made causes of Brazil's crisis and -underrate the risks ensuing for
the region as a whole.
• Financial turmoil in Asia and Russia induced several speculative attacks on the Brazilian real. However,
domestic policy failure caused the currency collapse: The Real Plan of 1994 was undermined by delay-
ing fiscal consolidation. Thus, crisis was looming since 1997, mainly because soaring public sector
deficits eroded the sustainability of the exchange-rate peg to the US dollar.
• After the decision for floating the real, Brazil still faces serious policy dilemmas. Devaluation has not
prevented a further rise in interest rates. Mounting debt-service obligations represent a fiscal time bomb.
Restructuring short-term debt involves the risk of prolonged financial volatility. It cannot be ruled out that
Brazil will impose capital outflow controls, the drawbacks of such a move notwithstanding.
• Brazil's crisis affects neighboring countries in several ways. Contagion transmitted through financial
markets has remained limited so far. If financial turbulence continues in Brazil, however, the pressure on
exchange rates, interest rates and stock markets is likely to increase in other Latin American countries.
Contagion through trade hits Brazil's Mercosur partners in the first place. Mexico, too, may be affected
as the devaluation of the real impairs the international price competitiveness of Mexican exporters on
third markets. In addition, the crisis may disrupt intra-Latin American investment relations.
• Short-term economic prospects of Latin America would deteriorate if the United States were no longer
prepared to absorb rising exports of crisis-ridden emerging markets. Protectionist sentiments may also
spread in Latin America, especially if world-market prices of the region's major commodity exports
remain depressed. In the light of Latin America's strong reliance on foreign capital, the greatest risk
appears to be that external financing of current account deficits will be curtailed.
• The current crisis may have as a result that structural reforms, required for Latin America's successful
participation in globalized production, will take second place for the time being. This applies especially to
Brazil where fiscal discipline required for short-term stabilization clashes with public investment needs,
notably in education. Deregulation of labor markets may be postponed in other Latin American countries,
too, in order to contain unemployment in the short run. Yet, Latin American governments should signal
their determination to stick to reforms even under conditions of financial turmoil. Privatization and public
sector reforms supporting better governance are of critical importance in this respect.
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Until recently, Latin American experts were
stunned, if not annoyed, by some sceptics rais-
ing doubts about optimistic assessments of the
region's economic situation. Latin America of-
fered a lot of good news indeed. Economic poli-
cy reforms gathered momentum and helped
restoring the region's attractiveness to foreign
capital, notably foreign direct investment
(Nunnenkamp 1998b). Financial crises in Asia
and Russia notwithstanding, GDP growth in
Latin America was estimated to exceed 2 per-
cent in 1998 (IMF 1998b; EIU 1999: 10). Fi-
nancial market conditions in Latin American
countries were considered to be sound (Deut-
sche Bank Research 1997; Dresdner Bank La-
teinamerika 1998). Hence, the risk of contagion
affecting Latin America appeared to be limited,
even though Brazil had to fight a first specu-
lative attack in October 1997 already.
The optimists were supported by the IMF's
Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, in No-
vember 1998, when Brazil and the IMF "suc-
cessfully concluded negotiations on a strong
three-year program of economic and financial
reform .... (which) will enhance market confi-
dence in the government's economic policies"
(IMF 1998a). Brazil was the test case for the
IMF's new approach to provide financial assis-
tance timely, in order to prevent currency crises
from happening in the first place.
It was widely believed that prophylactic fi-
nancial support by the IMF would offer to
Brazil, and indirectly to Latin America as a
whole, enough breathing space to undertake
fiscal adjustment and structural reforms and,
thereby, to sustain currency stability. Ironically,
this breathing space proved to be exhausted
even before some fulsome praise of Latin
America's bright economic future came out of
press (e.g., Fonds Magazin 1999).
Some optimists remain unimpressed by the
collapse of Brazil's currency, the real, in Jan-
uary 1999. Reportedly, the World Bank's Vice
President for Latin America, Javed Burki, con-
sidered economic turbulences in Brazil not to
be a crisis, but rather an opportunity to stronger
growth in Latin America as a whole {Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 25, 1999).
The President of the Interamerican Develop-
ment Bank, Enrique Iglesias, argued that Brazil-
ian policymakers have done nothing wrong, and
stressed favorable growth and investment pros-
pects (Handelsblatt, January 28, 1999).
Sceptics, including the present author, do
share the view that economic policy reforms in
Latin America have improved the region's
longer-term prospects of participating success-
fully in globalization. Short-term prospects are
clouded by considerable uncertainty, however.
The depth and length of recession in Latin
America is open to question. What is clear is
that Brazil faces further unpleasant policy di-
lemmas after the decision for floating the real
(Section II). Severe recession in Brazil almost
certainly has immediate repercussions on at
least some Latin American neighbors (Section
III). Short-term prospects may be depressed in
large parts of the region, in particular, by a
shortage of foreign capital inflows and low
commodity prices (Section IV). Even longer-
term prospects may be impaired by the current
crisis. This is likely to happen if the crisis
delays structural reforms needed to overcome
the still existing bottlenecks to successful par-
ticipation in globalization (Section V).
II. Brazil's Policy Dilemma after
the Collapse of the Real
Brazil has been the weak link in Latin America
since the outbreak of the Asian crisis. In Oc-
tober 1997, Brazil had to fight a first specula-
tive attack on the real (Nunnenkamp 1998a).
The country suffered contagion for the second
time, when Russia suspended debt-service pay-
ments to (foreign and domestic) creditors in
August 1998. International reserves of Brazil
declined by some 20 percent within a few
days, and Brazilian debt was downgraded by
Moody's (The Economist, September 12, 1998:
59).The irony is that the real fell only in January
1999, shortly after the IMF had agreed on fi-
nancial support in the order of US$ 41.5 billion.
IMF support to Brazil was explicitly designed
to preempt speculative activity against the real
(EIU, Country Report Brazil, 1998 (4th quar-
ter): 21). Brazil was allowed to draw as much as
US$ 37 billion of the total package before the
end of 1999. The IMF was confident that the
peg of the real to the US dollar was sustainable.
IMF support was considered instrumental to
strengthen private investor confidence which, in
turn, was thought to ensure external financing
of current account deficits of about 4 percent of
GDP.
In contrast to the IMF's First Deputy Manag-
ing Director, Stanley Fischer, various econ-
omists and financial market analysts considered
the real to be overvalued by 20-40 percent
(e.g., Sachs 1999; Dornbusch 1999). Therefore,
it is highly controversial to argue, as reportedly
done by the President of the Interamerican De-
velopment Bank, Enrique Iglesias (Handels-
blatt, January 28, 1999), that the Brazilian crisis
simply reflects contagion and has not been
caused by misguided economic policies. The
opposite view maintains that "it is all home-
made, just as Mexico at the time, with an
overvalued exchange rate and a huge budget
deficit, vast short-term foreign obligations and
an explosive indexed domestic debt" (Dorn-
busch 1999: 1).
Figure 1 presents the relevant facts. The real
appreciated significantly in real terms in 1994.
In subsequent years, further real appreciation
was avoided as the Piano Real of 1994 succeed-
ed in stopping hyperinflation. Nevertheless, the
current account deficit widened. Furthermore,
the fight against inflation was undermined by
delaying fiscal adjustment. The public sector
deficit doubled from 4 percent of GDP in 1996
to 8 percent of GDP in 1998. Only after the
collapse of the real, the Brazilian Congress has
started passing fiscal austerity measures, e.g.,
by agreeing to the long-awaited pension reform
on January 20, 1999 (Financial Times, January
22, 1999).
Fiscal adjustment, if it had been enacted in
1998, might still have prevented the currency
crisis. However, the belated approval by Con-
gress is likely to prove insufficient to resolve
the crisis. This is because the positive fiscal ef-
fects of pension reform and similar measures
may easily be outweighed by the "fiscal time
bomb" (Sachs 1999) to which the sharp devalu-
ation of the real may be the trigger. On March
5, 1999, the real/US dollar exchange rate stood
at 1.98, compared with 1.21 on December 30,
1998. The domestic currency equivalent of ser-
vicing Brazil's foreign debt of about US$90
billion rises accordingly. The same applies to
60-70 billion reais of domestic public debt that
is denominated in US dollar (IRELA 1999).
Fiscal accounts may receive another blow
from servicing short-term domestic debt de-
nominated in reais. Almost 70 percent of total
domestic public debt of about 320 billion reais
is indexed to the overnight interest rate (EIU,
Country Report Brazil, 1998 (4th quarter): 14).
One could have expected that servicing this
debt would become easier as the pressure on
interest rates was supposed to decline after the
devaluation of the real. However, the devalu-
ation did not help in bringing high interest rates
down. On the contrary, on January 18, 1999,
the Central Bank raised the interest rate by 5
percentage points to 41 percent. Although the
rate of inflation was still low at that time (2-3
percent), high and rising interest rates were con-
sidered necessary to prevent a return to hyper-
inflation, which may result from a still deeper
fall of the real.
By February 1999, it was no longer disputed
that Brazil will suffer deep recession in 1999
(Table 1). Growth forecasts continue to be re-
vised downwards. Taking into account forecast-
ing errors after the outbreak of the Asian crisis,
the currently expected GDP decline in Brazil of
about 5 percent may not be the final verdict.
The real rate of interest may come down to
reasonable levels if recent expectations on in-
flation of about 30^0 percent (Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, March 1, 1999) prove to be
correct.
1 Yet, private investor confidence is un-
likely to be restored unless it becomes clear
According to Brazilian sources, inflation shall be re-
stricted to 17 percent under the revised agreement of
March 8, 1999, between Brazil and the IMF.Figure 1 — Brazil: Public Sector Balance, Current Account Balance and Real Exchange Rate, 1994-1998
Public sector balance
and current account




























aEIU estimate for 1998. —
 b1994-1996: operational deficit, which discounts the inflation rate; 1997-1998: nominal deficit;
EIU estimate for 1998.
Source: IMF (1999b); EIU, Country Report Brazil (various issues).



































































































 cEstimates as of early 1999 ranee from 0.2 to more than 2 1












Source: Estimates and forecasts by the Kiel Institute, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch (via internet).how the Brazilian government will break out of
the vicious circle of rising nominal interest
rates, soaring debt-service payments and cur-
rency decline.
The federal government of Brazil was still
committed to IMF targets in early March 1999.
Fiscal austerity shall result in a primary surplus
in public sector balances of 3-3.5 percent of
GDP in 1999-2001 (IMF 1999a). Privatization,
particularly in the energy and financial sectors,
shall be intensified (IRELA 1999: 3). It is open
to question, however, whether state govern-
ments will play to IMF rules. Note that the
governor of Minas Gerais, the country's third
wealthiest state, contributed to trigger the crisis
by declaring a moratorium on interest payments
owed to the federal government. It is also de-
batable whether fiscal balance can be restored
without restructuring short-term domestic debt.
If Brazil is going to restructure domestic debt
by "lengthening the maturity at preset, moder-
ate but indexed rates" (Dornbusch 1999: 2), the
reaction of private investors is difficult to pre-
dict. The risk of further financial volatility ap-
pears to be considerable, even though the argu-
ment that nobody will lend to Brazil anymore
may be "absurd" (ibid.). If financial volatility
continues, the Brazilian government might feel
that there is no alternative but to renege on
earlier economic policy commitments (IRELA
1999).
The government may then choose between
two alternatives. The first option, suggested by
Dornbusch (1999), is to adopt a currency board.
This radical approach of fixing the exchange
rate and giving up monetary autonomy may re-
store macroeconomic stability, as the experi-
ence of Argentina shows. For this approach
to be credible and sustainable, however, more
rather than less fiscal adjustment would be re-
quired. At present, it is hard to imagine that this
solution is politically feasible in Brazil. Further-
more, under conditions of erratic exchange rate
movements, it is difficult to fix the exchange
rate at an appropriate level. Finally, Brazil may
lack the resources to adopt a currency board
(Krugman 1999). According to recent esti-
mates, international reserves of Brazil dwindled
from US$ 70 billion in mid-1998 to about
US$ 26 billion at end-February 1999 (excluding
IMF resources received; Frankfurter Allgemei-
ne Zeitung, March 3, 1999).
The second option, suggested by Krugman
(1999), is a temporary imposition of exchange
controls. Stopping capital outflows administra-
tively is supposed to offer better chances to re-
duce interest rates. But Latin American expe-
rience with capital outflow controls is not en-
couraging. In the past, capital flight tended to
persist as controls were circumvented in various
ways. More importantly still, foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) inflows into Brazil would be
discouraged if investors were uncertain about
future prospects to repatriate profits and capital.
Forgone FDI inflows would contribute to
further weakening of the real. The same effect
would result from the IMF not releasing sub-
sequent tranches of the financial support pack-
age if the Brazilian government were to impose
capital controls.
These drawbacks notwithstanding, it cannot
be ruled out that the Brazilian government will
return to traditional muddling-through attitudes
and will resort to heterodox measures under
conditions of prolonged financial turmoil.
Hence, economic forecasts are subject to a
considerable margin of error. This does not
only apply to Brazil, but also to neighboring
countries which have close economic ties with
the dominant player in the region.
III. Contagion in Latin America
Brazil's economic situation is exceptional in
important respects. Other Latin American coun-
tries contrast sharply with Brazil as concerns
public sector balances (Table 2). Fiscal ac-
counts appear to be under control in Argentina,
Chile, Mexico and Peru. Short-term interest
rates are below 10 percent in real terms in these
countries, compared with about 40 percent in
Brazil (Table 3). Several Latin American coun-
tries have in common, however, that they have
to finance large current account deficits. Ex-
ternal financing of large current account deficits

































aPercent of GDP; estimates based on various sources. — National currencies vis-a-vis US dollar; January 1994 = 100. —
cIn brackets: January 1995 = 100. —
 dWeighted with GDP of 1996.
Source: IMF (199b); estimates by the Kiel Institute.
spreads to neighboring countries (see also Sec-
tion IV below).
According to recent forecasts, not only Brazil
faces recession in 1999. Forecasts for Argentina
have been revised downwards by 4-5 percent-
age points since early 1999 (Table 1). Taken to-
gether, Brazil and Argentina account for almost
half of Latin America's GDP. Consequently,
continued — though reduced — GDP growth in
Chile, Mexico and Peru cannot prevent GDP
decline in 1999 in Latin America as a whole.
2
Recent growth forecasts for 1999 suggest
that the Brazilian crisis will not affect GDP
growth in Mexico, and will have only modest
effects on growth in Chile (for which growth
forecasts as of late 1998 were in the range of 2-
3 percent). Moreover, the Brazilian crisis so
far has not led to major revisions of growth
forecasts for 2000. All major Latin American
countries are widely expected to resume GDP
growth of around 3 percent in 2000. The as-
sumption that recession will be overcome short-
ly may prove to be overly optimistic if financial
turbulence continues in Brazil. In other words,
forecasts for 2000 are highly tentative.
The dominant player Brazil affects its Latin
American neighbors in several ways. The most
obvious way of contagion is through trade.
Intra-regional trade links have become stronger
Table 3 — Short-term Interest Rates and Inflation Rates in
Major Latin American Countries (percent)
Note that the forecast by Goldman Sachs of GDP
growth of 0.5 percent in Latin America in 1999
(Table 1) is no longer plausible, talcing into account

















aRecent estimates of consumer price

















since 1985 (Table 4). A rising share of Latin
America's exports (21 percent in 1997) is des-
tined for regional neighbors. Exports shipped to
the EU declined in relative importance, whereas
North America increased its share in Latin
American exports from 42 (1985) to 51 percent
(1997). Regional shifts in the structure of Latin
America's imports were less pronounced. Yet,
Latin America replaced the EU as the second
source of imports in 1997.
The trade structure differs significantly across
Latin American countries (Table 5):
• Intra-regional trade links are strongest for
Brazil's smaller Mercosur partners Paraguay
and Uruguay. For example, about 70 percent
of Paraguay's exports stay within the region,
with Brazil alone accounting for almost 40
percent of Paraguay's total exports.Table 4 — Latin America's Trade Structure, 1985-1997 (percent of total exports and imports)
Major trading partners


































































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various issues).












































































































































































































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1998); World Bank (1998a).• Argentina's exports, too, are largely directed
to its Mercosur partner Brazil. This may ex-
plain at least partly why GDP growth fore-
casts have been revised downwards for Ar-
gentina (Table 1).
• Bolivia may hardly be affected through trade
with Brazil in a direct way. Indirect effects
may turn out to be significant, however,
since about 45 percent of Bolivia's trade is
with Latin American neighbors.
• By contrast, Latin America plays a marginal
role in Mexico's overall trade. The same ap-
plies to all other trading partners, except
North America. This explains why Mexico is
expected to be the fastest growing country in
1999 among the countries listed in Table 1.
North America is also a more important trad-
ing partner than Latin America for Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
• Chile and Peru are likely to be affected most
among Latin American countries by de-
pressed prospects of exporting to Japan and
Asian developing countries.
The hypothetical direct GDP effect of chang-
ing trade relations with Brazil after the collapse
of the real can be assessed by taking into ac-
count (i) Brazil's share in total trade of Latin
American partner countries, and (ii) the share of
total trade in partner countries' GDP. Calcu-
lations reported in Figure 2 are based on the
— arbitrary — assumption that Brazil will ex-
pand its exports by 10 percent, and reduce its
imports by 10 percent. Paraguay would suffer
the strongest GDP decline by far, followed by
Uruguay. Direct GDP effects would remain
modest (0.6 percent) in Argentina, and would
be still lower in all countries outside Mercosur,
including the associated member Chile. Argen-
tina's strong trade links with Brazil notwith-
standing, direct GDP effects are limited by the
fairly low share of total trade in Argentina's
GDP (Table 5).
Trade effects resulting from the Brazilian
crisis may be seriously understated in Figure 2,
however. Previous financial crises in Mexico
and Asia suggest that actual changes in Brazil-
ian exports and imports may far exceed the as-
sumed 10 percent change:
• The devaluation of the Mexican peso in De-
cember 1994 induced a reduction in Mexi-
co's imports by about 9 percent in 1995
(IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook
(various issues)). At the same time, Mexico's
exports expanded by more than 30 percent.
• Crisis-ridden Asian countries did not succeed
to raise their exports in 1998. Nevertheless,
trade effects were significant as imports of
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand decreased
by about one-third in 1998 (Reisen 1999:
Table 7).
Most recent developments indicate that Ar-
gentina, in particular, may suffer more serious
trade effects than given in Figure 2 (IRELA
1999: 5). Reportedly, Argentina's automobile
exports, which are largely destined for Brazil,
fell by about 30 percent in January 1999. Ar-
gentina's imports of consumer goods and pri-
mary products from Brazil soared, in some
cases by more than 200 percent, in the last two
weeks of January 1999.
3
Figure 2 does not capture any indirect trade
effects which the devaluation of the real may
have on third markets. Brazil's international
price competitiveness has improved relative to
Latin American competitors. The significance
of price effects depends on the degree of sub-
stitutability between the exports of Brazil and
the exports of other Latin American countries.
For example, Brazilian exports of automobiles
(including automotive parts and components) to
Europe and the United States may expand at the
expense of Mexico's exports of automobiles.
Colombia is likely to suffer indirect trade ef-
fects as world demand for coffee will shift from
Colombia to Brazil. In the case of Argentina,
the constitutional commitment to maintain the
US dollar parity in the convertibility system
rules out the option of restoring price competi-
tiveness vis-a-vis Brazil by devaluating the
Argentine peso (IRELA 1999: 5). Hence, in-
direct trade effects are likely to be significant,
The correctness and representativeness of these
figures is questionable, however. Apparently, they
have been released by Argentine sources in order to
mount an attack on Brazil's export subsidies. I owe
this point to Rolf Schinke.10


















Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Ecuador Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
aDirect GDP effects, assuming that Brazil's exports increase by 10 percent and Brazil's imports decrease by 10 percent.
Source: Table 5.
even though they are almost impossible to be
quantified and may take time to develop.
Furthermore, contagion is not limited to
trade effects. Investment relations within Latin
America represent a second transmission mech-
anism. Intra-Latin American investment has
become increasingly important in recent years
(IDB-IRELA 1996: 59 ff; UNCTAD 1997b:
74; UNCTAD 1998: 252). For example, about
12 percent of FDI stocks in Argentina (1992)
and Bolivia (1994) were held by investors from
other Latin American countries (IDB-IRELA
1996: Tables 40 ff.). FDI inflows into Argen-
tina originating from within the region account-
ed for almost one-fifth of total FDI inflows into
Argentina in 1992-1995 (UN-CEPAL 1997:
120).
While comprehensive data on intra-Latin
American FDI are still lacking, UN-CEPAL
(1998) has collected available information on
FDI flows in 1997 (Table 6). Accordingly, in-
vestors from Argentina, Chile and Mexico in-
vested considerably within the region. Brazil re-
corded minor FDI outflows to Latin American
countries in 1997, but Brazil ranked second to
Chile in terms of outward FDI within Latin
America as of early 1997 (UNCTAD 1997b:
74). Brazil's FDI in Latin America appears to
be concentrated in Argentina, particularly in the
automobile and autoparts industries as well
as in the financial industry of Argentina
(UNCTAD 1998: 252). FDI flows from Brazil
to Argentina may be affected in the first place
by Brazil's economic problems.
The crisis may have ambiguous effects on
FDI flows from Latin American neighbors to
Brazil. On the one hand, the devaluation of the
real improves Brazil's attractiveness for export-
oriented FDI.
4 On the other hand, deep reces-
sion in Brazil tends to discourage FDI oriented
towards local markets. The depressing effect on
FDI in Brazil is likely to dominate if continued
financial volatility causes Argentine and Chil-
ean investors to postpone further engagements
in Brazil. Moreover, investors from Argentina
may be constrained financially with their home
country moving into recession as well.
If recessionary tendencies were spreading in
Latin America, intra-regional FDI relations
would likely be disrupted on a broader scale.
The effects of such a development on Brazil
tend to be small compared with other Latin
Obviously, this does not only apply to FDI from
Latin American sources. The devaluation of the real
may also induce foreign investors from the United
States and Europe to redirect export-oriented FDI to-
wards Brazil. This will impair the chances of Ar-
gentina, in particular, to attract export-oriented FDI.
Nevertheless, total FDI flows to Brazil are expected
to decline in 1999 (see Section IV below).11
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Source: UN-CEPAL (1998); UNCTAD (1998).
American host countries. In Brazil, intra-re-
gional FDI contributed only modestly to total
FDI inflows (12 percent) and, as is typical for a
large country, total FDI represented a relatively
small share in gross fixed capital formation
(Table 6). Elsewhere, intra-regional FDI ac-
counted for a large share in total FDI inflows,
notably in Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela.
Moreover, gross fixed capital formation in these
host countries depends heavily on FDI inflows.
For example, gross fixed capital formation in
Bolivia may decline by about 20 percent if Ar-
gentina were no longer to invest in this country.
The Asian crisis suggests that contagion
transmitted through international financial mar-
kets represents the most serious threat Latin
America is facing after the collapse of the real.
Yet, the evidence available indicates that finan-
cial contagion has remained limited in Latin
America so far:
• Recent exchange rate developments reveal
that the collapse of the real has not affected
exchange rates in other major Latin Ameri-
can countries (Figure 3). Most importantly,
Argentina's currency board has been main-
tained and the Mexican peso continued to
fluctuate just mildly. The decision of Ecua-
dor in mid-February 1999 to float the Sucre
seems to be taken mainly because of the dif-
ficult economic situation of Ecuador itself
(depressed oil prices, "El Nino"-effects),
rather than because of contagion from Brazil.
Risk premia, as reflected in short-term inter-
est-rate spreads over US interest rates, may
indicate whether private investors consider
Latin American countries to represent sepa-
rate risks or rather a common risk group.
Data on interest-rate spreads presented by
Merrill Lynch (1999) support the notion of
separate risks if average interest-rate spreads
since early 1997 are compared across coun-
tries. For example, interest-rate spreads rare-
ly exceeded 600 basis points in Argentina,
whereas they ranged from 1,500 to 4,500
basis points in Brazil.
To assess the significance of financial con-
tagion, changes in interest-rate spreads seem
to be more relevant than average levels. Con-
sidering the period 1997-1999, interest-rate
spreads in Brazil peaked for the first time in
fall 1997 (Merrill Lynch 1999). The same
happened in Argentina, whereas interest-rate
spreads remained more or less unchanged
throughout 1997 in Chile, Mexico, Peru and
Venezuela. Contagion was more pronounced
in late summer 1998, when interest-rate
spreads peaked in all major Latin American
countries.
Financial contagion in late summer 1998 not-
withstanding, correlation analysis (covering
the period from August 1997 to March 1999)
reveals that short-term interest rates in major
Latin American countries were mostly un-
related to short-term interest rates in Brazil12
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Table 7 — Correlations between Short-Term Interest Rates in Brazil and in Other Latin American Countries, August 1997-
March 1999
Argentina Chile
a Colombia Mexico Venezuela
Brazil 0.12 0.09 0.002
aAugust 1997-December 1998. — *significant at the 10 percent level.
0.44* 0.03
Source: The Economist, Emerging-Market Indicators (various issues).
(Table 7). Most surprisingly perhaps, the rise
in Brazilian interest rates since January 1999
has not induced rising interest rates in other
major Latin American countries (Figure 4).
• By contrast, stock market developments
were strongly correlated between major Latin
American countries since September 1997
(Figure 5).
5 In early 1999, however, stock
market developments have diverged. Floating
the real resulted in an increase in Brazilian
share prices (in terms of reais) by about 50
percent from January 11 to March 8, 1999.
During the same period, share prices in-
creased in Chile and Mexico, but declined in
Colombia, Venezuela and — though only
marginally — in Argentina.
6
All in all, the Brazilian crisis is likely to
affect other Latin American countries in various
ways. Some of Brazil's neighbors will suffer
significant trade effects. Intra-regional invest-
ment relations may be disrupted, particularly if
recession spreads to other countries. The rather
weak evidence on financial contagion until
March 1999 may be attributed to Brazil's ex-
ceptional economic situation, especially its fis-
cal problems that are much more serious than
elsewhere in the region (refer to Table 2 above).
However, the financial indicators presented in
this section must be interpreted with consider-
able caution. The limited evidence available so
* Comparing stock market developments in Brazil with
stock market developments in other Latin American
countries results in correlation coefficients ranging
from 0.68 (Brazil/Colombia) to 0.87 and 0.89 (Brazil/
Argentina and Brazil/Mexico, respectively). Note that
Figure 5 portrays stock market developments in na-
tional currencies.
" In US$ terms, share prices have declined slightly in
Brazil since early 1999 (The Economist, March 13,
1999: 136). Yet, stock market developments in Latin
America have diverged in US$ terms as well, with
Mexico reporting the steepest increase (21 percent)
and Venezuela reporting the steepest decrease (22
percent).
far may prove unreliable for assessing future
risks, especially if financial turbulence contin-
ues in Brazil.
IV. Critical Factors Shaping
Short-Term Prospects
As shown before, most analysts expect Latin
America to recover in 2000 (Table 1). It de-
pends on various factors whether this optimistic
outlook will prove correct. First of all, it is cru-
cial that Brazil succeeds in containing reces-
sion. This will only be achieved if real rates of
interest come down to reasonable levels, and if
the servicing of (domestic and foreign) debt
does not undermine the stability of the domestic
financial system (as has happened in Asian
countries):
• It cannot be taken for granted that investment
in Brazil will receive a push from lower in-
terest rates in the short run. Earlier hopes that
floating the real would result in an immediate
fall in interest rates were frustrated. By def-
inition, rising inflation in 1999 will lower the
real rate of interest. However, the Central
Bank may need to raise the nominal rate of
interest further if fears about a return to hy-
perinflation fuel capital flight. As a matter of
fact, the Central Bank decided on March 4,
1999, to raise the interbank rate for daily
transactions from 39 to 45 percent.
• The soundness and efficiency of the Brazil-
ian banking system was hardly disputed until
late 1998 (Dresdner Bank Lateinamerika
1998: 17 ff.).
7 Recently, however, financial
Reportedly, nonperforming credit accounted for about
8 percent of total bank loans; loan-loss reserves were
fairly high (11 percent of total bank loans).14
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market analysts expressed concerns that
Brazilian banks have hedged their foreign
currency obligations only partly (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, February 16, 1999).
Mounting debt-service obligations and deep
recession are likely to increase the share of
non-performing loans. A further weakening
of the real is expected to cause problems
even for basically sound banks.
Second, for several Latin American countries
(notably for Mexico), the United States is a
critically important actor (Table 5). The expect-
ed slowdown of economic growth in the United
States to about 2 percent in 2000 (forecast by
the Kiel Institute) renders it rather unlikely that
US demand for Latin American exports will
pull the region out of recession. A still greater
risk is that the US administration will give in to
various protectionist pressure groups. Senti-
ments may spread that the United States can no
longer bear the adjustment burden resulting
from higher exports of crisis-ridden emerging
markets, including those in Latin America.
Third, the collapse of the real may give rise
to trade conflicts within Latin America. The
Mercosur faces a litmus test. Bilateral trade dis-
putes between the major Mercosur partners Ar-
gentina and Brazil would not come as a sur-
prise, taking into account earlier conflicts, for
example, relating to automotive trade. Uruguay
anticipates serious balance of payments troubles
resulting from the devaluation of the real,
which improves Brazil's price competitiveness
vis-a-vis its trading partners (IRELA 1999: 6).
Uruguay has threatened to unilaterally suspend
the Mercosur tariff regime if Brazil will not put
an end to its export subsidies. It is open to
question whether Brazil will agree to compen-
satory measures that are most likely to be
sought by its Mercosur partners if the real re-
mains depressed.
Fourth, the combination of low international
commodity prices and the still high dependency
on commodity exports of several Latin Ameri-
can countries hinders quick economic recovery.
Commodity prices are of particular relevance
for the export prospects of oil-exporting coun-
tries (notably Venezuela and Ecuador) and ma-
jor suppliers of ores and metals (Bolivia, Chile
and Peru) (Table 8).
8 Copper prices will remain
depressed in 1999 and are unlikely to recover in
2000 (EIU 1998a: 8). Particularly Chile and
Peru are affected negatively. Likewise, reve-
nues from oil exports are not expected to re-
cover in the foreseeable future. Even Mexico,
for which oil exports have lost tremendously in
relative importance, encounters adjustment pro-
blems because of depressed oil prices (EIU
1999). The Mexican government decided in
early 1999 to raise tariffs on imported interme-
diates (by 3-10 percentage points) from coun-
tries that do not have preferential trading ar-
rangements with Mexico, in order to compen-
sate for declining oil revenues (Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, March 4, 1999). This indi-
cates that unfavorable prospects related to com-
modity exports represent another threat to an
open trading environment in Latin America.
Table 8 — Share of Selected Product Categories in Total



















































Fifth, and maybe most importantly, external
financing of large current account deficits is
no longer guaranteed. The reliance of Latin
America on foreign capital is fairly strong. In
contrast to developing countries in East Asia,
In Colombia, too, export earnings in 1999 will suffer
from low world market prices of oil and coffee (EIU
1998b: 8). By contrast, Brazil imports oil and, hence,
benefits from low oil prices. Moreover, low inter-
national prices of iron ore and coffee have a minor
impact on Brazil. Iron ore and coffee accounted for 9
and 4 percent of total Brazilian exports in 1996, re-
spectively (EIU, Country Report Brazil, 1997 (4th
quarter): 5).17
the share of gross domestic savings in GDP
has been low and declining in various Latin
American countries (Nunnenkamp 1998a: Table
1). For example, the savings ratio was below 20
percent in 1996 in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
and Peru (World Bank 1998b). Strong reliance
on foreign capital is also revealed by high
shares of FDI inflows in gross fixed capital for-
mation. In 1996, this share amounted to almost
13 percent in Latin America as a whole, com-
pared with 7.4 percent in developing Asia
(UNCTAD 1998: Annex table B.5).
According to projections of the Institute of
International Finance, foreign capital flows to
Latin America may dry up in 1999 (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, January 28, 1999). More-
over, foreign investors are expected to demand
high risk premia when engaging in Latin Amer-
ica. This applies especially to Brazil, where risk
premia declined only slightly (to 13 percent for
Brazilian C-bonds) after the devaluation of the
real. Brazil is also expected to experience a sub-
stantial decline in FDI inflows in 1999.
The effect of each of these risk factors on
Latin America's short-term economic prospects
cannot be quantified precisely. It should be
clear, however, that recession would be deepen-
ed and economic recovery would be retarded if
several adverse developments were to occur at
the same time.
V. Will the Structural Reform
Agenda Remain Unfinished?
In late 1997, IRELA (1997) presented an as-
sessment of macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reform efforts in Latin America. It
was shown that reforms since the late 1980s
have had positive results in various respects
(see also Nunnenkamp 1998b). At the same
time, several bottlenecks remained which, if
untackled, were likely to compromize Latin
America's longer-term prospects to participate
successfully in globalized production and mar-
keting:
• The labor market "is virtually untouched by
reform" (IRELA 1997: 4). Labor market
legislation in most Latin American countries
dampens job creation in the formal sector,
since it distorts the price of labor relative to
capital.
• Latin America, notably Brazil, is lagging be-
hind Asian competitors in terms of human
capital formation. More and better qualified
labor is needed in order to attract world-mar-
ket oriented FDI, which depends on comple-
mentary factors of production in host coun-
tries.
• Survey results point to deficiencies with
regard to business-related services and infra-
structure (e.g., transportation, distribution
and communication systems) (WEF various
issues).
• Competitive disadvantages of Latin America
are also spotted in the area of public de-
cision making (transparency, corruption and
bureaucratic interference with private busi-
ness) (see also Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder
1998).
These issues should still figure high on the
policy agenda. The hazard is that longer-term
challenges may take second place as long as
Latin American policymakers are preoccupied
with crisis management. Delays in structural re-
forms are most likely in areas involving im-
mediate financial trade-offs. Fiscal discipline
required for short-term stabilization clashes
with public investment required for overcoming
structural bottlenecks.
For the time being, this conflict may hinder
human capital formation in the first place. Pro-
longed financial turbulence will probably have
as a result that public investment in education
and health care is curtailed and postponed.
Likewise, the chances to stimulate private in-
vestment by lowering business taxes appear to
be remote. As a consequence, the adjustment
of production and export structures to Latin
America's comparative advantage may be re-
tarded.
The impetus to structural reforms is easier
to maintain in areas which are part of inter-
nationally supported adjustment programs. For18
example, Brazil is committed under the IMF
program to speed up privatization, particularly
in the energy sector and in financial services.
This may save public resources and, at the
same time, help improve the availability and ef-
ficiency of business-related services. However,
private sector involvement in services and infra-
structure may prove insufficient to compensate
for reduced public investment, which is likely
to result from fiscal consolidation.
Against this backdrop, it is all the more im-
portant to tackle without delay those issues that
do not involve direct financial trade-offs. This
is not to ignore the difficulties of pushing for-
ward labor market reforms and sustaining open-
ness to foreign trade during recession. Deregu-
lation of labor markets may add to unemploy-
ment in the short run, and give rise to social
tension as long as "there is virtually no pro-
tection for the unemployed" (IRELA 1997: 9).
Latin American governments may also be
tempted to reverse trade opening in order to
contain unemployment in the short run. Hence,
it is not only for immediate financial constraints
that structural reforms may take second place
until recession is overcome in Latin America.
Yet, Latin American governments may send
clear signals to domestic and foreign investors,
indicating their determination to stay on course
even under conditions of financial turmoil. Pub-
lic sector reforms leading to better governance
are of critical importance in this respect. Brazil,
for example, "should immediately put the re-
maining privatizations on the table and get them
done, without corruption" (Dornbusch 1999: 2).
Dornbusch may be overly optimistic and over-
states his case when arguing that privatization is
half the story of reform, and retreating from
arbitrary rule making and interference with
business life is the other half. However, privat-
ization and good governance would definitely
alleviate fiscal constraints and help restore
private investor confidence in Brazil and in the
region as a whole.
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